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The M Word: From Partial Coverture to
Skills-Based Fiduciary Duties in Marriage
Jo Carrillo*
In 1934, fictional California resident Cora Papadakis had to decide:
Should she divorce her husband, ensuring her future poverty, or should she
stay with a husband whom she did not love? The answer to Cora's
dilemma can be found in James M. Cain's The Postman Always Rings
Twice, one of a handful of novels written about marital discord in the male-
management era of community property in California.'
Cora was in her early twenties when she married her much older
spouse, Nick, a tavern owner in the Prohibition era. She no doubt recited
the standard vows: I, Cora, take thee, Nick, as my lawfully wedded spouse,
to have and to hold, for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, till
death do us part. At the start of her marriage, Cora hardly could have
imagined that her day-to-day management of the Twin Oaks Tavern, which
included long hours as cook, wait staff, and dishwasher, would not translate
into legal management. As her marriage progressed, Cora realized that the
Twin Oaks Tavern was not hers at all. She discovered that if her marriage
were to end in divorce, she would have nothing. Cora also learned that
during her marriage she held nothing, that is, she controlled and managed
nothing in a legal sense.
These oppressive financial realities dishearten Cora and compromise
her feelings for Nick. She feels trapped, burdened by the realization that
only Nick's natural death will give her the financial recognition that she
deserves. Cora finally voices her complaint: "Isn't that business half mine?
Don't I cook? Don't I cook good?" 2
I. TO HA VE AND TO HOLD IN THE MALE MANAGEMENT
ERA: 1849 TO 1975
Before 1975, a husband in the state of California had complete legal
management over community (marital) property by virtue of his gender
* Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
appreciate and thank Kathryn Edwards who suggested that I write an essay about the vows
that I sometimes use as an end of semester review for California Community Property Law.
1. JAMES M. CAIN, THE POSTMAN ALWAYS RINGS TWICE (Vintage Crime 1992) (1934).
2. Id. at 16-17.
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alone. Subsidiary rules benefitted him in his management rights.
Transmutations-changes to the character of property-could be made by
oral agreement, either express or (more ominously) implied. Thus, the law
of spousal fiduciary duties, the topic of this essay, was rudimentary at best
during this time period.
A. CALIFORNIA'S FIRST MARITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
Early California was of two minds when it came to women as wives.
One mind sought to lure women of means to the rough-and-tumble gold
rush state. To do this, the California Constitution of 1849 enshrined
protection for married women's separate property. The original Act of
1850 codified the constitutional protection by creating two categories of
marital property: separate and community.5 The other mind, however,
believed women to be frail, fragile, dependent, and therefore incapable of
managing property during marriage. Ostensibly to protect married women
from the rigors of property management, the original Act of 1850 gave
married men absolute power to manage and control all property. This rule
impaired a married woman's separate property ownership by giving her
husband the legal right to control her separate property. It also impaired a
married woman's management rights by giving her husband the legal right
to manage her separate property. Moreover, the original Act required a
married woman to obtain her husband's consent before she could execute a
will. Thus, her testamentary rights were impaired until 1866, when she
regained the right to devise her separate property in her will, and those
rights remained constrained until 1923, when she obtained the right to
devise her one-half interest in the community property.7
B. TAKING BACK THE RIGHT: "FRAIL" WIVES TAKE TO THE COURTS
Marriage in California has no doubt always been an institution where
love and understanding abide, but from a legal perspective, marriage is not
3. See J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA
ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 257-
69 (1850) (recording the arguments for and against adopting separate legal protection for
married women in the California Constitution).
4. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (1849).
5. Act of Apr. 17, 1850, ch. 103, §1, 1849-50 Cal. Stat. 254. The California statute,
like the constitutional provision, shows the influence that Texas law had on California law
makers. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 20, 1840, 2 GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAS 177, 177-180 (1898);
Act of Mar. 13, 1848, ch. 79 §§ 2, 3, 1848 Tex. Laws 77, 77-79 (preserving property owned
before marriage as the husband's or wife's separate property). For an overview of the
development of the California system, see GAIL BiRD & JO CARRILLO, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY (10th ed., forthcoming 2011).
6. Act of Apr. 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 6, 1849-50 Cal. Stat. 254.
7. Act of Mar. 20, 1866, ch. 285, § 2, 1865-66 Cal. Stat. 316 (establishing that a
married woman no longer needs her husband's consent to write a will that disposes of her
separate property). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (Deering 2006).
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a sacred institution; it is a contractual one. As such, marriage is an
institution where practical concerns define love. A quick survey of
California community property appellate cases suggests that, despite any
perceived fragility married women of nineteenth-century California had
with respect to the rigors of property ownership, wives maintained a strong
presence in the courts to defend what was theirs.
A few examples illustrate early changes toward marital equity that have
become the rock solid foundation of California community property law.
In 1860, a wife of means learned that her husband had pledged the
dividends from her separate property stock to his creditors.9 The wife sued
to identify the dividends as her separate property. She successfully argued
that the California Constitution protected her right to separate property, and
by implication, to any rents, issues, and profits earned by her separate
property.' 0 The California Supreme Court agreed, stating, "We think the
Legislature has not the Constitutional power to say that the fruits of the
property of the wife shall be taken from her, and given to the husband or
8. BARBARA BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF CLARA FOLTZ (2011). Upon
marriage, Clara Shortridge Foltz, whose portrait hangs on my office wall at the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law, shifted her aspirations from a professional
career to "a handsome, noble husband, who would cherish her and keep her sheltered from
the unknown world in a happy little home." Id. at 6. Later, when Clara's sewing machine
was attached by her husband's creditors (twice), Clara got her sewing machine back by
arguing that it was a "workman's tool used to support the family-a separate statutory
exemption." Id. at 7. Eventually, Clara had to shift her aspirations again because her
husband left her and she had children to care for. Clara became the first female attorney to
be sworn in on the Pacific Coast. Id. at 31. Clara's aspirations for her law practice took her
to Hastings, the law school where I have spent my professional career. The janitor barred
Clara at the door per instructions of the school authorities, and the (male) students mocked
her in class. Clara appealed to Judge Serranus Hastings, the school's founder and first dean,
who made no effort to hear her out, much less to assist her. Id at 43-44. After only a few
days as a law student, Clara received a letter from the Registrar informing her that the Board
of Directors had resolved not to admit women to Hastings College of the Law, and it was
later explained to her by Dean Serranus Hastings that her presence-that is, the fact that she
was a woman, along with her rustling skirts-distracted the other scholars of law. Id. at 42-46.
I call Clara Shortridge Foltz by her first name because for two decades, I have kept
Clara's portrait by my side, literally, as I work. Whether Clara was discretely behind my
office desk (in my first years of law teaching) or on my office wall (in later years), Clara has
been a guiding light for me at Hastings College of the Law, serving as comfort and
inspiration for those (many, many) days when 1, too, have felt the pressures of being cast as
the antithesis of people's stereotypes of what a law professor should look like, physically
speaking. Clara thought that, had she been born a man, she might have had more substantial
success in law. Some people doubt it; they think that Clara's success came because she was
an underdog. I, however, understand exactly what Clara meant.
Clara Shortridge Foltz died before I was born, but I have stood on the strong
shoulders of Clara's blessed memory for twenty years. For that reason and so many more, I
am pleased to be able to thank Barbara Babcock, who first told me about Clara when I was a
student, for her page-turning book, which is an important work of legal history about early
California.
9. George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322, 323 (1860).
10. Id. at 323-24; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(3) (Deering 2006).
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his creditors."" Today, that wife's proposed reading of the California
Constitution is a central part of California community property law, which
defines separate property as property that is brought to a marriage, or
acquired during a marriage by gift, and any rents, issues, and profits of
separate property.12 It would not be until 1872, however, that a married
woman would regain the legal authority to manage her separate property
and its rents, issues, and profits."
Also in 1860, ironically, the California Supreme Court interpreted the
term community property to mean a "mere expectancy."' 4 The practical
effect of the court's interpretation was a setback for married women's
property rights. The rule transformed a married woman from co-creator of
value to the equivalent of an heir apparent waiting for a windfall from her
husband. Under this rule, a married woman acquired no vested rights in
marital property during her marriage. Instead, at the termination of her
marriage, she held a mere expectancy in the community property, which is
something less stable, legally speaking, than even a contingent interest. It
took the California legislature until 1927 to recognize that community
property interests are "present, existing and equal," which is to say vested
at the time the property is acquired."
In yet another early case, a husband put a small down payment on a
parcel of real estate before marriage, with the idea that he would pay off the
installment loan with community funds.' 6 During divorce proceedings, the
husband argued that the real estate was entirely his separate property, since
he had purchased the land before marriage with a down payment from oil
that had been extracted from the land. The wife argued that the property
was partially owned by the community since community funds were used
to make installment payments to purchase the property. '7 The wife's
rationale made its way into California community property law, where it
holds a central place today. The use of community funds during marriage
to pay for property acquired on credit by one spouse before marriage gives
the community estate an equitable pro rata ownership interest in that
property. Because title is inchoate until the purchase money loan is paid
11. George, 15 Cal. at 323-24.
12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a) (Deering 2006).
13. 1 THEODORE H. HITTELL, THE CODES AND STATUTES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Marriage § 1516, at 595 (1876) (providing that a married woman can convey her separate
property). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(b) (Deering 2006).
14. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860) ("[T]he title to [community]
property rests in the husband. He can dispose of the same absolutely, as if it were his own
separate property. The interest of the wife is a mere expectancy, like the interest which an
heir may possess in the property of his ancestor.")
15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (Deering 2006).
16. Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 224 (1926).
17. Id. at 225.
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off, a community's contributions to a purchase loan, out of fairness, earns
the community estate an ownership right.' 8
C. AN EARLY PUSH TOWARD DUAL CONTROL
A few important restrictions on a husband's legal right to manage
community property made their way into California law by statute at the
beginning of the twentieth century. First, in 1891, the California legislature
restricted the husband's power to make gifts of community personal
property without the wife's written consent.19 Today, a slightly expanded
version of this protection appears in gender-neutral form at California
Family Code section 1100(b).20 Second, in 1901, the legislature restricted
the husband's power to convey or encumber home furnishings or wearing
apparel without the wife's written consent.2 1 Today, this protection appears
in gender-neutral form at California Family Code section 1100(c). 22 Third,
in 1917, the legislature restricted the husband's power to sell, encumber, or
lease community real estate without the wife's signature.23 Today, this
restriction is gender-neutral and appears at California Family Code section
1102.24
In 1951, building on the Grolemund principle, which allows creditors
to reach only those assets which a spouse has the legal right to manage and
control, the legislature granted a wife the power to manage her own
community property earnings and personal injury awards.25 To do this,
however, a married woman had to open a separate bank account into which
she deposited such funds. The married woman could manage the funds in
her work earnings account, but if she commingled them with any other
community property funds, then her account, like Cinderella's lovely
coach, would turn into a pumpkin: The shield would drop, the woman
would lose her legal right to manage the funds in her work earnings
account, the husband would regain the legal right to manage those same
funds, and the funds would be reachable (again) by the husband's creditors.
Today, this shield provision appears in gender-neutral form as California
Family Code section 911, but the shield only protects the spouse who relies
on it from certain of the other spouse's premarital creditors.2 6
Before 1970, a spouse seeking a divorce was required to establish that
at least one of the several grounds for divorce existed. These grounds
18. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. at 229-30.
19. Act of Mar. 31, 1891, ch. 220, § 1, 1891 Cal. Stat. 425.
20. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(b) (Deering 2006).
21. Act of Mar 23, 1901, ch. 190, § 1, 1901 Cal. Stat. 598.
22. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(c) (Deering 2006).
23. Act of May 23, 1917, ch. 583, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 829-30.
24. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (Deering 2006).
25. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 689-90 (1941).
26. CAL. FAM. CODE § 911 (Deering 2006).
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included adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect,
habitual intemperance, and conviction of a felony.27 Proof of fault had
economic consequences-namely, that the wronged spouse was entitled to
more than half of the community property. The greater the fault, the larger
the share of community property the wronged spouse took from the
marriage. In 1970, California moved to no-fault divorce, and today under
the California Family Code, there are only two grounds for dissolution:
incurable insanity and irreconcilable differences.28 Just as the presence of
fault had economic consequences before 1970, the absence of fault has
economic consequences-the primary one being that the no-fault system
fortifies a fifty-fifty split of community property at dissolution or death.29
D. POSTMAN'S ALTERNATE ENDING: WHAT IF CORA DIVORCED?
The following is an inventory of what Cora Papadakis, our accidental
femme fatale, would have and hold by virtue of her marriage in California
in the late 1920s or early 1930s.
Since Cora came to her marriage with no property of her own, she
would have no separate property to take with her upon divorce. Nick, by
contrast, owned the Twin Oaks Tavern before his marriage to Cora, so the
Twin Oaks Tavern would be designated as Nick's separate property at
divorce, with any excess profits possibly defined as community property. 30
Cora was not paid for her labor at the Twin Oaks Tavern, so she would
have no cash savings. Had Cora been paid, Nick would have nevertheless
retained the legal right to manage and control Cora's earnings and tips, and
any property, real or personal, Cora might have purchased with her
earnings and tips.
Cora could argue that both her labor and Nick's labor gave their
community estate an equitable pro rata ownership share in the Twin Oaks
Tavern as a business. This would be correct.3' Cora did own a vested right
to one half of any community property identified in the Twin Oaks Tavern
business as of 1927, a plus for her. But, given the short length of Cora and
Nick's marriage, the community property share of the Twin Oaks Tavern
business would be de minimus, at best. Cora's share of that de minimus
community property interest would be fifty percent. Therefore, Nick
would capture most of the Twin Oaks Tavem's business value at divorce,
and likely all of the underlying value of the real estate upon which the
27. Assemb. Comm. Rep. of 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation, 1969 CAL. LEG. ASSEMB.
DAILY J. 8053, 8054-55 (Aug. 8, 1969). Proof of fault was required in all divorce
proceedings except those involving allegations of incurable insanity. Id.
28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (Deering 2006).
29. CAL. FAM. CODE § 750 (Deering 2006).
30. See Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7 (1909).
3 1. Id.
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Twin Oaks Tavern was located. Moreover, under the fault system of
divorce, if Nick could prove that Cora had engaged in extramarital sex with
Frank Chambers, he might capture all of the Twin Oak Tavern's value,
based on the theory that Cora was at fault for the dissolution of the
community and thus that she should pay an economic penalty for her
sexual infidelity.
Would Cora's financial situation be better if her marriage to Nick
ended by his death? The Postman Always Rings Twice is a crime novel,
and I can reveal without spoiling the plot that Cora is charged with the
murder of Nick. This potentially defines Cora as a felonious spouse whose
rights to take Nick's property by devise or intestacy would be barred by
statute, again on the theory that no person can take advantage from his or
her wrong.3 2 But, if Nick were to die of natural causes, then Cora could
inherit Nick's property through intestacy, and her financial future might
take a turn for the better.
To sum up, at the end of Cora and Nick's marriage by divorce, chances
are that Cora would walk away with nothing but her clothing and personal
effects. At one point, Cora decides to leave her marriage. She puts her
personal effects into a hatbox and takes them to the car. Frank Chambers,
her lover, asks, "The car?" She responds, "Aren't we taking the car?" He
says, "Not unless you want to spend the first night in jail, we're not.
Stealing a man's wife, that's nothing, but stealing his car, that's larceny."
Cora says, "Oh." She starts to walk to the bus stop with Frank, but within a
quarter of a mile, she stops. "Frank, I can't go on. Goodbye." She turns
around and walks back to the Twin Oaks Tavern in tears. 33
By her early twenties, Cora had had enough experience with gender
relations to realize that her lover's perspective was as troublesome to her
financial future as her husband's legal power. With her lover, Cora's
future would consist of getting a job, and thus of working for an employer
for hourly wages. At least with her husband, Cora had the day-to-day
fulfillment of managing a business. It may not have been her business in
the legal sense (unless Nick were to die of natural causes), but in a
psychological sense, Cora came to regard the Twin Oaks Tavern as half
hers; thus, she assumed its management as a valuable expression of her
personal identity. For Cora, marriage was not defined by romantic love for
her husband. Rather, it was defined in rational terms as a way for her to
engage in a project that gave her a sense of personal accomplishment and
hope for her financial future.
As The Postman Always Rings Twice draws to a close, legal questions
about Nick's death resolve. It turns out that Nick purchased a life
32. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (Deering 2006).
33. CAIN, supra note 1, at 29-30.
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insurance policy with a double indemnity clause just before he died. Cora
walks away on probation, with $10,000 of cash from Nick's policy, and full
legal ownership of the Twin Oaks Tavern. Under Cora's capable
management, the Twin Oaks Tavern flourishes. In fact, Cora is far more
skilled and determined to succeed at what is now her business than her
deceased husband Nick ever was. As a widow, Cora is able to escape some
of the limitations placed upon her legal rights and financial prospects by
the male management system.
II. TO HA VE AND TO HOLD TODAY: EQUAL MANAGEMENT
AND SKILLS-BASED FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Had Cora married Nick just half a century later, the community
property laws of California would have better borne out her point of view
that the Twin Oaks Tavern was half hers in a legal sense. Equal
management went into effect in California in 1975, when the legislature
passed a statute providing that "either spouse has the management and
control of community personal property." 34 This transition to de jure
equality between the spouses was mostly recorded in a process of
legislative change that showed how marriage was evolving from an
institution of legal coverture for women, as in the early days of the original
Act, to one of equal rights for both spouses. Nevertheless, equal
management rights did not immediately change the subsidiary laws of male
management, and the law defining interspousal duties remained
rudimentary at best.
The first statute imposing fiduciary duties on a spouse was passed in
1992, and updated in 2002.35 Today, the law of spousal fiduciary duties is
developing at a rapid pace; it provides California community property law
with a foundation for marriage that puts skills-based financial duties
somewhere at the center of day-to-day married life. The duties are skills-
based because they require formalized knowledge of concepts such as
accounting, disclosure, access, financial loyalty, good faith, care, and
holding in trust any benefits or profits derived from a transaction in which
one spouse acted without the consent of the other. Either spouse acting
alone can manage and control the community property, but the acting
spouse should also know that he or she will be held to general and specific
fiduciary duties, the breach of which give rise to an actionable claim by the
36
non-acting spouse.
34. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (Deering 2006).
35. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (Deering 2006).
36. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (Deering 2006).
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A. CHANGES TO THE SUBSIDIARY RULES FURTHER SUPPORT THE
TRANSITION TO EQUAL MANAGEMENT
After the passage of equal management, fissures in the subsidiary rules
that had supported the male management regime began to show up in
disputes over marital property. To address some of those fissures,
legislators made important changes to California community property law
beginning in the early 1980s. First, the legislature formalized
transmutation, meaning changes in character of property.37 Second, The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was enacted in 1985, and important
additions to that Act were made in 2001, codifying California Supreme
Court interpretations of voluntariness and fairness.38 Third, spouses won a
statutory right to reimbursement for separate property contributions to
community property acquisitions. 39 Fourth, the legislature expanded the
rule that all joint form property is presumptively community property at
divorce, and enumerated formalities for rebutting that presumption. 40 Fifth,
the community won a right, in certain cases, to reimbursement for
41
contributions to the direct educational expenses of one spouse.
In the aggregate, the 1980s changes made an important statement about
the law's economic aspirations for marriage. These changes clarified legal
rights, formalities, and reimbursements between spouses, but they left the
definition of interspousal fiduciary duties undefined. More to the point, the
changes of the 1980s stressed the importance of the interspousal agreement
to California community property law. The concept of agreement was no
longer based on a loose sense of obligation implied from factual
circumstances or from unmemorialized intentions, as under the prior law.42
Rather, it was based on a documented two-way communication, negotiated
on the basis of voluntariness, disclosure, and demonstrated mutual
understanding between the spouses.
37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (Deering 2006).
38. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1601-1617 (Deering 2006); In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal.
4th 1 (2000); In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman, 24 Cal. 4th 39 (2000).
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (Deering 2006).
40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (Deering 2006).
41. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (Deering 2006).
42. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751 (1985) (holding that two-way
communication disputed at divorce where spouses entered into an oral agreement resulted in
the transmutation of the family residence); In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366 (1980)
(considering a dispute, in which one-way communication disputed at divorce where spouses
had no oral agreement, but contributing spouse intended to use separate property funds as a
way for that spouse to purchase separate property rather than as a contribution to the
purchase of community property).
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B. MARRYING IN GOOD FAITH: ABIDING BY THE SPECTRUM OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
By the 1990s, the nature of the spousal relationship was re-imagined
again. In the past, the law recognized that spouses were in a confidential
relationship, but there was little understanding of their mutual fiduciary
duties.43 Today, spouses are still in a confidential relationship, and they
also explicitly owe each other duties of loyalty, good faith, access, and
disclosure." Such interspousal duties seem basic, yet they can act as
powerful checks on financial mismanagement given that they are derived
from the law governing nonmarital business partners. 45 In a day-to-day
context, the general duties of good faith, loyalty, and care, coupled with the
more specific duties of access and disclosure, play out along a spectrum.
At the practical end are the duties to provide access to books, records,
accounts, and other financial information. At the judgment end of the
spectrum, the duties include not dealing with the community partnership
adversely or competitively and not engaging in a knowing violation of the
law, intentional misconduct, or grossly negligent or reckless conduct.46
Either spouse can control and manage the community property, but
there are limits to that right. For instance, fraudulent acts affecting the
rights of the other spouse,47 or acts of gross mismanagement amounting to
constructive fraud,4 8 are not within a spouse's management and control
rights. Actions that constitute breaches of fiduciary duty that impair the
other spouse's community property interest give rise to a cause of action.49
Impairment is defined statutorily as an act that can arise from one or more
transactions-including a series or pattern of transactions-that have or
will cause a detrimental impact to the claimant spouse's undivided one-half
interest in the community estate.o In addition, general interspousal
43. Prior case law indicated that although the spouse exercising management and control
over community property may "act like an owner," he was an owner with quasi-fiduciary
obligations. See, e.g., Vai v. Bank of Am., 56 Cal. 2d 329 (1961); Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 443 (1949).
44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (Deering 2006).
45. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (Deering 2006), which incorporates by reference CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 16403, 16404 and 16503.
46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a), (g), (h) (Deering 2006).
47. "She has . .. rights therein which have been always safeguarded against the
fraudulent or inconsiderate acts of her husband with relation thereto and for the assertion
and safeguarding of which she has been given access to appropriate judicial remedies both
before and after the time when her said rights and interests would ripen and become
vested. . . whenever such rights and ultimate interests were affected by or threatened with
such forms of invasion." Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 342-43 (1926).
48. Kirby v. S.F. Say. & Loan Soc'y, 95 Cal. App. 757 (1928). If the act is deliberate,
penalties may be imposed under California Family Code section 2602.
49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (Deering 2006).
50. Id. (stating that a spouse has a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the
fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half
266 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:2
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fiduciary duties encompass all specific statutory restrictions against
unconsented transfers of community personal property that were enacted at
the turn of the twentieth century." In cases where there is a breach of
fiduciary duty that results in impairment, damages are set by statute.5 2
Because the impairment cause of action is a tort, depending on the
circumstances of the breach, the claimant spouse can recover damages from
fifty percent to one-hundred percent of the impairment, plus court costs and
attorney's fees.53  Moreover, should there be a harm to the community
estate without a specific statutory remedy under the California Family
Code, the bare fact that the spouses own community property concurrently
will give rise to a remedy under the California Civil Code.54 Additionally,
a spouse can recapture personal property transferred out of the community
estate without the other's written consent55 and avoid certain real estate
transactions that lack both spouses' signatures. 56
Furthermore, a particular act that falls within the sphere of a spouse's
legitimate management and control authority may still be actionable if that
action constitutes a breach of an interspousal fiduciary duty. An example is
the use of community funds to pay one spouse's separate debts. The timely
payment of debt is conduct that falls well within a spouse's right to manage
and control, and debt repayment protects the community's financial
position generally. However, the use of community funds to pay for
separate debt impairs the nondebtor spouse's interest in the community
property, giving the nondebtor spouse a right to petition for an accounting
57during marriage.
In other words, California permits interspousal lawsuits.58 Divorce or
death are not prerequisites for suing one's spouse (or a decedent spouse's
estate) for breach of interspousal fiduciary duties (though issues of
financial loyalty, good faith, and disclosure frequently come up during the
interest in the community estate, including, but not limited to, a single transaction or a
pattern or series of transactions, which transaction or transactions have caused or will cause
a detrimental impact to the claimant spouse's undivided one-half interest in the community
estate).
51. See Act of Mar. 31, 1891, ch. 220, § 1, 1891 Cal. Stat. 425; CAL. FAM. CODE §
1101(b) (Deering 2006); Act of Mar. 23, 1901, ch. 190, § 1, 1901 Cal. Stat. 598; CAL. FAM.
CODE § 1101(c) (Deering 2006); Act of May 23, 1917, ch. 583, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 829-30;
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (Deering 2006).
52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a), (g), (h) (Deering 2006).
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g), (h) (Deering 2006).
54. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 21 Cal. App. 3d 457, 459 (1971) (holding that a spouse's right to
maintain an action against the other spouse is not dependent upon statutory authority, as for
every wrong, there is a remedy per California Civil Code section 3523).
55. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1100-1101 (Deering 2006); Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690
(1935).
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (Deering 2006).
57. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (Deering 2006).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101 (Deering 2006).
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routine accounting that occurs as part of a dissolution proceeding or the
administration of a decedent spouse's estate).59  As such, California
community property law recognizes that spouses may address property
issues and allegations of community property impairment from within the
context of an intact marriage. While this might decrease the spouses'
present emotional happiness, it can increase their utility curve for wealth,
as one spouse signals to the other that personal finances, investment
opportunities, and opportunity costs are, and will be, closely monitored
during marriage.
C. PROMISES, PROMISES: A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
To HA VE AND TO HOLD
So, how do prospective spouses learn about and honor the duties of
loyalty, good faith, and disclosure (record keeping), which are clearly part
of the legal basis of marriage in California today? Are the skills-based
fiduciary duties envisioned by community property law part of the cultural
and social foundation of marriage? If we marry for love, what exactly does
that mean in terms of our legal rights and duties towards our spouses?
Before the transition to equal management-in the community property
regime under which Cora Papadakis "lived"-to have and to hold meant
something physical and tangible. To have meant to bring another person
into one's life; to hold meant to keep another person in one's life in a
physical sense. The legal regime reflected this understanding of marriage
by empowering one spouse to control and manage the marital property at
the expense of the other spouse. One spouse was protector; the other
(theoretically) protected.
Today, marriage is a contractual concept that affords equal property
management, allows formal contracting between spouses, and imposes
skills-based fiduciary duties upon each spouse. To have still means to
bring another person into one's life, but it also means to have that person's
financial strengths and weaknesses affect one's financial future. To hold
still means to keep another person in one's life in a physical sense, but it
also means to hold that person's trust when it comes to issues of finances.
We live in a culture where it is considered more taboo for two people to
talk intimately about money than it is to talk about sex.60 And yet, talk we
59. California Family Code section 1101 expressly provides that a court may order an
accounting of the property and obligations of the parties to a marriage and may determine
the rights of ownership in or access to the community property; such relief may be sought
without filing an action for dissolution. See also Fields, 91 Cal. App. 2d at 451-52; Wilcox,
21 Cal. App. 3d at 458-59. See generally Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties
Under California's Community Property Laws, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 227 (1982).
60. This is my opinion based on twenty years of teaching property law, and a half-
decade of specifically teaching a course on personal finance issues at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law.
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must. In this era of skills-based fiduciary duties, today's spouses create
complicated records of potentially actionable financial transactions, many
of which are poorly documented amidst the day-to-day stresses of dealing
with children, careers, commutes, and so on. When marital unhappiness
leads to marital dissolution, spouses are forced to talk finances. These
discussions must clarify past, present, and future finances, as seen through
the lens of past, present, and future actions that had, have, or will have an
effect on one or both parties' financial future.
Prospective spouses who are contemplating marriage must understand
that fiscal realities and duties play a bigger role in the legal definition of
marriage today than they did in the past. Graduates enter the workforce
indebted. Employment prospects can be uncertain. Socioeconomic
class lines are pronounced and intractable. 63  Consumer debt remains
high. 4 Spouses have and hold equally, at least in the legal sense; yet the
aggregate effect of a negative dowry (coming to a marriage with debt in the
form of car loans, credit cards, students debt, medical debt, a compromised
credit score, dim job prospects, and so forth) can create financial
inequalities in a relationship.65 This in turn takes a toll on a spouse's trust
and fidelity with respect to joint financial interests, which may compromise
marital satisfaction over all.66 Accordingly, prospective spouses are
advised to disclose to their future spouse as much as possible in terms of
what they own and what they owe, and to take seriously the need to learn
basic accounting, relationship, and emotional skills that might facilitate
their practice of skills-based fiduciary duties. Increasingly, this is what the
law of marriage requires.
61. See, e.g., TAMARA DRAvT, STRAPPED: WHY AMERICA'S 20- AND 30-SOMETHINGS
CAN'T GET AHEAD (2007) (suggesting legislative policy to counteract the financial obstacles
that young adults of different educational backgrounds face in the United States today).
62. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE (2004) (discussing how today's middle
class parents with children at home are financially more vulnerable to financial distress than
their parents' generation because today both parents cannot afford not to work and yet,
given child and home care costs, both parents cannot afford to work).
63. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETrING BY IN
AMERICA (2008) (detailing the educated author's efforts to join the low-wage work force as
a waitress, hotel maid, house cleaner, nursing-home aide, and Wal-Mart salesperson in
Florida, Maine, and Minnesota to report on how plausible it is to survive on minimum-wage
jobs).
64. See, e.g., ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT (2001) (analyzing the macroeconomic and
microeconomic consequences of excessive reliance on national and personal debt).
65. See, e.g., NATALIE H. JENKINS, Scorr M. STANLEY, WILLIAM C. BAILEY, & HowARD
J. MARKMAN, YOU PAID How MUCH FOR THAT? How TO WIN AT MONEY WITHOUT LOSING
AT LOvE (2002) (popularizing research on negative dowry issues).
66. See, e.g., Linda M. Skogrand et. al., The Effects of Debt on Newlyweds and
Implications for Education, 43:3 J. ExTENSION (2005) (survey data from random sample of
2,823 newlyweds in a western state), available at http://www.joe.org/joe/2005june/rb7p.shtml.
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Perhaps this requirement could be reflected in marriage vows as a
secular blessing for the couple. I offer this template:
I, take you, as my partner and spouse, to have
and to hold my physical, emotional, and financial hopes, dreams,
and trust.
I take you, , for richer or for poorer, understanding
that I am entrusted, as are you, to create security for our family. I
promise you to base whatever security we may enjoy on honesty,
loyalty, truth, sharing, and equal partnership between us, in all
matters, including financial.
I take you, , in sickness and in health. I understand
that by honoring the trust that you place in me, I will contribute to
your health and happiness; I will contribute to my own health and
happiness; and I will contribute to our health and happiness
together.
I honor the love and trust that we share as our most valuable
form of wealth.
May I place my vows upon your lips as a kiss, and my hopes for
us-as individuals and as partners-on your hand as a ring, both
symbols of my love for you.
[kiss and ring]
With my words, my kiss, and this ring, I, , take
you, , as beloved partner and spouse from this day
forward.
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